Wyndham Street Investments Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Guelph*
The Corporation of the City of Guelph v. Wyndham Street Investments Inc.
[Indexed as Guelph (City) v. Wyndham Street Investments Inc.]
63 O.R. (3d) 481
 O.J. No. 674
Docket Nos. C37497 and C37496
Court of Appeal for Ontario
Morden, Doherty and Feldman JJ.A.
February 28, 2003
*Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed with costs October 9, 2003 (McLachlin C.J.C., Major and Arbour JJ.).
Highways — Stopping up — Closing — Statutory interpretation — Conflict between statutes — Lands of closed highway included in redevelopment plan under Planning Act
— Disposition of lands subject only to provisions of Planning Act — Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, s. 315 — Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 22-25, 71.
Municipal law — Highways — Stopping up — Closing — Statutory interpretation — Conflict between statutes — Lands of closed highway included in redevelopment plan under Planning Act — Disposition of lands subject only to provisions of Planning Act — Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, s. 315 — Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 22-25, 71.
Planning — Redevelopment area — Highways — Stopping up —
Closing — Statutory interpretation — Conflict between statutes — Lands of closed highway included in redevelopment plan under Planning Act — Disposition of lands subject only to provisions of Planning Act — Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
M.45, s. 315 — Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 22-25, 71.
Statutes — Interpretation — Conflict — Lands of closed highway included in redevelopment plan under Planning Act — Disposition of lands subject only to provisions of Planning Act
— Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, s. 315 — Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 22-25, 71.
The City of Guelph (the “City”) entered into an agreement to sell lands that were part of a redevelopment area pursuant to the 1980 Planning Act. Before their acquisition and inclusion in the redevelopment area, the subject lands had been part of a street that had been closed in the early 1980s. In a proceeding brought by the City for a declaration, the issue was whether, in disposing of the subject property, the City was required to comply with s. 315 of the 1990 Municipal Act, which would require the City, among other things, to offer to sell the lands to the owner of the land abutting the land to be sold. On the application, Caswell J. held that s. 315 of the Municipal Act did not apply because the Planning Act provided a complete scheme governing all dealings with lands within a redevelopment area and, more particularly, she held that because s. 25 of the Planning Act would have been made redundant if s. 315 applied, then, by implication, s. 315 must be excluded. The owner of the abutting land appealed.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
The complete scheme argument relied upon by Caswell J. was not a satisfactory basis for the conclusion that the provisions of the Planning Act excluded the application of s. 315 of the Municipal Act. Section 25 of the Planning Act could be read to have the practical purpose of bringing to the [page482] attention of the reader that the Municipal Act’s provisions are applicable to the acquisition of land under the Planning Act. A legislative provision, while redundant from a strictly legal point of view and intended only to assist in the reading of the statute, cannot have the far-reaching consequences of excluding the operative effect of s. 315 of the Municipal Act with respect to the disposition of land. However, s. 315 could not stand with the provisions of the Planning Act for a different reason. There was a conflict between s. 315 of the Municipal Act and s. 22(8)(b) of the Planning Act and, under s. 71 of the Planning Act, in the event of a conflict, the provisions of the Planning Act prevailed. Section 315 of the Municipal Act and s. 22(8)(b) of the Planning Act could not stand together.
Compliance with one law involved a breach of the other. Accepting that the City had a duty to sell under s. 315 and to offer to sell the lands to the abutting owner, this duty conflicted with the power to sell the lands under s. 22(8)(b) (either separately or as part of a larger parcel) solely
“for use in conformity with the redevelopment plan”. Clearly implicit in s. 22(8)(b) was the prohibition from selling for any other purpose. The City could not sell under s. 315 without contravening s. 22(8)(b). For these reasons, the appeal should be dismissed.
Cases referred to
Albert v. Spiegel (1993), 17 C.P.C. (3d) 90 (Ont. C.A.) Statutes referred to
Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302
Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, ss. 5, 111, 191(1), 315
Planning Act, 1983, S.O. 1983, c. 1
Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 22, 24, 25, 71
Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, ss. 28(8), 74
Rules and regulations referred to
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, rule 14.05(3) Authorities referred to
Sullivan, R., Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 2002)
Bennion, F., Statutory Interpretation, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002)
APPEAL from a judgment of Caswell J. (2001), 56 O.R. (3d) 490, 27 M.P.L.R. (3d) 35 (S.C.J.) on an application for a declaration.
Rodney L.K. Smith, Q.C., for appellant.
Barnet H. Kussner and Kim Mullin, for respondent.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
 MORDEN J.A.: — The appellant, Wyndham Street Investments Inc., appeals from a judgment of Caswell J. which declared that “the proposed sale by the Corporation of the City of Guelph to Barrel Works is not subject to s. 315 of the [page483] Municipal Act [and that] the City is not required to comply with the provisions of s. 315 of the Municipal Act and offer to sell the s. 315 lands to the abutting owner, Wyndham Street Investments Inc.” [See Note 1 at end of document] Caswell J.’s reasons are reported at 56 O.R. (3d) 490.
 As the wording of this order indicates, Wyndham asserted against the City the right, under s. 315 of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, to have the City offer to sell to Wyndham land that abuts property owned by Wyndham. The City asserted, in opposition to Wyndham’s position, that because the land is in a “redevelopment area”, as defined in the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, s. 22(1)(b), [See Note 2 at end of document] it is not obliged to offer the land for sale to Wyndham, but is entitled to sell it, as part of a larger parcel, to another corporation. [page484]
 Before I set out the relevant statutory provisions, I shall set forth an outline of the facts. They are conveniently set forth in the application judge’s reasons under the heading “Agreed Facts”, as follows [at pp. 493-94 O.R.]:
1. The property involved in this application is a portion of a stopped-up or closed highway known as Quebec Street, which itself was part of a large land assembly in the downtown area of the City of Guelph known as the Guelph Eatons Centre in the early 1980s.
2. The area was developed first in 1980 under a Downtown Revitalization Agreement between the City and the province pursuant to s. 22 and s. 24 of the Planning Act, 1980 whereby funds were provided by the province to the City for the purpose of carrying out the City’s redevelopment plans.
3. In order to establish the redevelopment area, the City passed the necessary by-laws to amend the official plan and applied to the Minister of Municipal Affairs for the requisite approvals, which were received.
4. The Downtown Revitalization Agreement refers to the redevelopment plan made pursuant to s. 22 of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1970. It is agreed that the legislation referred to is, in fact, the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1980, and that the agreement is subject to this legislation.
5. Pursuant to the 1980 agreement, the City was required to close certain public streets, including Quebec Street. The City followed normal procedures and gave the appropriate notices to effect the closings.
6. The overall development scheme was that the City would lease the lands to a company known as Chartwoods Developments Limited, and it would be Chartwoods who would carry out the actual construction of the shopping centre mall including building the Eatons department store as the anchor store. The lease was for a period of 60 years, to expire in 2042.
7. The Eatons store location has been redeveloped as a sports and entertainment centre. The balance of the lands are the subject of a proposed sale by the City to a company known as Barrel Works Limited (“Barrel Works”). The closed-up portion of Quebec Street now comprises part of the pedestrian mall and part of the mall buildings themselves.
8. Over the years between 1984 and 1999, the ground lease was assigned on several occasions. In 1998, Eatons was closed. In 1999, REOCO Limited, the present assignee of the lease, surrendered the lease of the Eatons store to the City and assigned the lease for the balance of the shopping centre lands to Guelph Centre Property Group (“GCOG”). Ministry approval of the interim agreement with GCOG was received. The lease to GCOG was always intended as a stopgap measure; the long term intention being to sell the property. Any further disposition of the lands would require further approval of the Minister in accordance with the terms of the 1980 agreement.
9. In 1999, there were expressions of interest shown in the property by three different groups being: Southside Developments, Barrel Works and M. Lesic, In Trust. The City entered into an agreement for sale [page485] with Southside Developments in January 2001 and passed the requisite resolution on January 22, 2001.
10. In 1996, Wyndham bought the property which abuts the s. 315 lands on which was located a two-storey building and proceeded to build a third storey. At that time there was no issue concerning the s. 315 lands because there was no sale of these lands pending by the City. Wyndham entered into negotiations with the City for easements and parking agreements for the commercial and residential condominium units to be constructed.
11. On or about March or April 2001, Wyndham became aware of a potential claim to the s. 315 lands after the City
had agreed to sell the balance of the shopping centre mall to Southside. The City has admitted that the council resolution dated January 22, 2001 is a determination to sell the lands within the meaning of s. 315 of the Municipal Act.
12. In June 2001, the Southside Developments Agreement was terminated. In July 2001, the City invited the three original bidders to update their bids and re-present their proposals. The City selected the Barrel Works bid and entered into an agreement of purchase and sale on September 6, 2001. The agreement included a 90-day due diligence clause. On September 19, 2001, that clause was extended to 45 days after this court renders its decision on this application.
13. Wyndham listed the Woolworth property for sale on November 12, 2001 and the stopped up portion of the Quebec Street lands is not part of the property that has been listed for sale.
The Relevant Statutory Provisions
 Section 315 of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45 provides, in part:
315(1) Subject to sections 316 and 317, where a highway or any part of a highway over which a municipality has jurisdiction has been closed under this Act, the Registry Act or the Land Titles Act and the council of the municipality determines to sell the land forming the highway or the part of the highway so closed, the land shall be sold in accordance with this section.
(2) The council shall by by-law set the sale price of the land to be sold and shall offer to sell it to the owner of the land abutting the land to be sold and where,
(a) there are parcels of land abutting on opposite sides of the land to be sold, the owner of each parcel has the right of first refusal to purchase the land to its middle line;
. . . . .
(3) If a person entitled under subsection (2) to purchase the land does not exercise the right to purchase within such period as may be fixed by by-law, the municipality may sell the land that the person had the right to purchase to any other person at the price set under subsection (2) or at a greater price.
(4) Where the municipality is unable to sell the land at or above the sale price set under subsection (2), the council may set a lower price under that subsection and this section applies to a sale at the lower price. [page486]
(5) Where land is sold to an abutting owner under this section, the sidelines of the parcels abutting the land to be sold shall be extended to include the land to be sold in such manner as the council considers fair and reasonable.
 The relevant parts of ss. 22 and 25 of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379 provide: 22(1) In this section,
(a) “redevelopment” means the planning or replanning, design or redesign, resubdivision, clearance, development, reconstruction and rehabilitation, or any of them, of a redevelopment area, and the provision of such residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, institutional, religious, charitable or other uses, buildings, works, improvements or facilities, or spaces therefor, as may be appropriate or necessary;
(b) “redevelopment area” means an area within a municipality, the redevelopment of which in the opinion of the council is desirable because of age, dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement, unsuitability of buildings or for any other reason;
(c) “redevelopment plan” means a general scheme, including supporting maps and texts, approved by the Minister for the redevelopment of a redevelopment area.
(2) The council of a municipality that has an official plan in respect of land use may, with the approval of the Minister, by by-law designate the whole or any part of an area covered by such an official plan as a redevelopment area, and the redevelopment area shall not be altered or dissolved without the approval of the Minister.
(3) When a by-law has been passed and approved under subsection (2), the municipality, with the approval of the Minister, may,
(a) acquire land within the redevelopment area;
(b) hold land acquired before or after the passing of the by-law within the redevelopment area; and
(c) clear, grade or otherwise prepare the land for redevelopment.
. . . . .
(8) For the purpose of carrying out the redevelopment plan, the municipality, with the approval of the Minister, may,
(a) construct, repair, rehabilitate or improve buildings on land acquired or held by it in the redevelopment area in conformity with the redevelopment plan, and sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any such buildings and the land appurtenant thereto;
(b) sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any land acquired or held by it in the redevelopment area to any person or governmental authority for use in conformity with the redevelopment plan.
. . . . .
25. The provisions of the Municipal Act apply to the acquisition of land under this Act. [page487]
 Relating s. 22(3) to the facts of this case, it may be noted that Quebec Street was acquired by the City before the passing of the by-law designating the redevelopment plan, and that the Minister’s approval covered the City’s holding of this land within the redevelopment area (s. 22(3)(b)). With respect to s. 22(8)(b), the municipality is empowered to sell land acquired or held by it within the redevelopment area.
The Application Judge’s Reasons
 In her reasons, the application judge stated the issue before her as follows [at p. 495 O.R.]: “to determine whether the City’s disposition of the lands within a redevelopment area is subject only to the provisions of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980 or is also subject to the provisions of s. 315 of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980”. She concluded that the disposition was subject only to the Planning Act.
 She came to this conclusion [at p. 498 O.R.] on the general basis that “s. 22 of the Planning Act is the complete scheme governing all dealings with lands that are specifically designated as located within a redevelopment area” and on the more specific ground that s. 25 of the Planning Act by negative implication excludes the application of s. 315 of the Municipal Act.
 In my view, the “complete scheme” approach is an unsatisfactory basis for the application judge’s conclusion. It begs the question of whether the relevant Planning Act sections can be properly interpreted as providing for a scheme that is so exclusive that it negates the application of any other law relating to dealings with land in a redevelopment area. I think that what is really involved in this part of the case is the question of whether there is a conflict between the Planning Act and the Municipal Act provisions and, if so, which Act should prevail. I deal with this question later in these reasons.
Is there a negative implication in s. 25 of the Planning Act?
 I deal first with the negative implication that the application judge drew from s. 25 of the Planning Act. She held that because this provision referred only to “the acquisition of land under this Act” it should be read as excluding other provisions of the Municipal Act, specifically, provisions in it relating to the disposition of land, including s. 315. In this regard, she said [at p. 497 O.R.]:
There is no reference in either statute that the provisions of the Municipal Act govern the disposition of lands under the Planning Act [emphasis in original]. [page488]
The logical approach is to consider that s. 25 applies only to the acquisition of lands and excludes the disposition of lands within a redevelopment area. The apparent conflict concerning the acquisition of lands is resolved on a careful reading of both s. 25 and s. 22(3)(a). The operative words are “within the redevelopment area”. All other lands which the City acquires are subject to the sections of the Municipal Act relating to acquisitions. However, dispositions of land continue to be governed by the Planning Act only. It is appropriate to apply in these circumstances the expressio unius rule, since one would expect that dispositions would be dealt with as well as acquisitions in the context of the Municipal Act. As R. Sullivan says in Driedger, supra:
Legislation is supposed to be drafted in a coherent and orderly way. It thus follows from sound drafting practice that a partial enumeration of like things is meant to be exhaustive, and anything left off the list is by implication meant to be excluded.
 With great respect to the application judge, I do not think that s. 25 of the Planning Act gives rise to any negative implication.
 In concluding that the terms of s. 25 of the Planning Act exclude the application of s. 315 of the Municipal Act, the application judge applied the expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim: “to express one thing is to exclude another.” (R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at p. 186). In my view, the maxim is not capable of supporting the application judge’s conclusion.
 The most important consideration in determining the meaning of s. 25 is its purpose, more specifically, its legal function. It is part of the City’s argument that:
in the absence of s. 25 of the 1980 Act, neither acquisitions nor dispositions of land authorized under the Planning Act would be subject to the provisions of the Municipal Act; any other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of rendering section 25 wholly redundant. Accordingly, it is only by virtue of section 25 of the Planning Act that the acquisition of land under the Planning Act is rendered subject to the Municipal Act, and in the absence of any reference in section 25 (or anywhere else in the Planning Act for that matter) to a disposition of land, it must continue to be the case that the Municipal Act does not apply.
(Emphasis in original)
 I disagree with the submission that in the absence of s. 25, acquisitions authorized under the Planning Act would not be subject to the provisions of the Municipal Act. In this regard, I refer to ss. 5 and 191(1) of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, both of which have been in this Act for decades.
5. Where power to acquire land is conferred upon a municipal corporation by this or any other Act, unless otherwise expressly provided, it includes the power to acquire by purchase or otherwise and to enter on and expropriate. [page489] 191(1) The council of every corporation may pass by-laws for acquiring or expropriating any land required for the purposes of the corporation, . . .
 It may be seen from s. 5 that not only is s. 25 of the Planning Act not necessary for a municipality to acquire land by expropriation under s. 22(3) of the Planning Act but, indeed, that an express statutory provision would be required to exclude the power of expropriation of land under this provision. With respect to s. 191(1), no doubt “the purposes of the corporation” include acquiring land for a redevelopment plan under s. 22 of the Planning Act.
 Having regard to this context, what is the function of s. 25? While it is redundant from a strictly legal point of view, it serves the practical purpose of bringing to the attention of the reader that the Municipal Act’s land acquisition provisions are applicable to the acquisition of land under the Planning Act. It is a form of convenient cross- referencing to the relevant provisions in the Municipal Act. It is an example of a common legislative technique. For an example close to home in this case, see s. 111(2) of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45 and s. 28(8) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, both of which make the same provision relating to the granting of bonuses by municipal councils. See also, generally, R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (2002) at pp. 161-62 and F. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), at pp. 993-94 with respect to the use of deliberate redundancy.
 In light of the above, it would be flatly inconsistent with the purpose of s. 25 to read into s. 25 the negative implication contended by the City. If s. 25 were not in the Planning Act, the overall legal position would be the same. The City would have the power to purchase or expropriate land for a redevelopment plan. In these circumstances, the City could not argue that the Planning Act contained a provision that implicitly excluded the disposition provisions in the Municipal Act. A legislative provision intended only to assist in the reading of a statute cannot have such far-reaching consequences. I conclude that s. 25 does not exclude the operative effect of s. 315 of the Municipal Act.
The Issue of Conflict between the Planning Act and the Municipal Act
 I begin with a reference to s. 71 of the Planning Act [R.S.O. 1990], which provides:
71. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this and any other general or special Act, the provisions of this Act prevail. [page490]
 For this provision to govern, there would have to be a conflict between s. 315 of the Municipal Act and s. 22(8)(b) of the Planning Act. The test for determining whether a conflict exists is stringent. I refer to the following passage in R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (2002) at p. 265:
The courts do not resort to the conflicts avoidance strategies at their disposal unless there is a genuine conflict. For this purpose, conflict is narrowly defined. In Tabernacle Permanent Building Society v. Knight [ A.C. 298 at 302 (H.L.)], Lord Halsbury said that so long as the Acts under review can “stand together and both operate without either interfering with the other”, there was no inconsistency or conflict. In Toronto Railway Co. v. Paget [(1909), 42 S.C.R. 488 at 499], Anglin J. said:
It is not enough to exclude the application of the general Act that it deals somewhat differently with the same subject-matter. It is not “inconsistent” unless the two provisions cannot stand together.
In Friends of Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) [ 1 S.C.R. 3 at 38-39], La Forest J. noted the similarity between this approach and defining conflict in the constitutional law context:
There is also some doctrinal similarity to the principle of paramountcy in constitutional division of powers cases where inconsistency has also been defined in terms of contradiction — i.e., “compliance with one law involves breach of the other”; see Smith v. The Queen [ S.C.R. 776 at 800].
 I think that the circumstances of this case give rise to a conflict. Section 315 of the Municipal Act and s. 22(8)(b) of the Planning Act cannot “stand together”. Compliance with one law involves a breach of the other. I accept that the City had a duty to Wyndham to offer to sell the Quebec Street lands to it under s. 315 in the event that it determined to sell these lands. However, the power to sell these lands under s. 22(8)(b) (either separately or as part of a larger parcel) was solely “for use in conformity with the redevelopment plan”. Clearly implicit in this is the prohibition from selling for any other purpose. The City cannot sell under s. 315 without contravening s. 22(8)(b).
 Wyndham has argued that the interest that it has under s. 315 is the same as, or analogous to, that of the owner of an easement that crosses a parcel of land to be sold under s. 22(8)(b). To give clear title to the purchasing developer, the City would be required to deal with the owner of the easement to obtain the release of its interest. Wyndham submits that it could not be argued that the sale under s. 22(8)(b) would extinguish the easement and that the same reasoning applies to Wyndham’s s. 315 interest.
 With respect, the nature of Wyndham’s potential interest in the land is not analogous to that of the owner of an easement [page491] or of any other existing interest in land. The very act which triggered Wyndham’s submitted right of first refusal was a determination to sell under s. 22(8)(b). If it is implicit in s. 22(8)(b) that the City cannot sell for any purpose other than “for use in conformity with the development plan”, as I have held, then it seems to me that the terms of s. 22(8)(b) preclude a property right arising in Wyndham.
 The foregoing, I think, is sufficient to resolve the conflict issue. I might add, however, that if s. 315 of the Municipal Act were given effect and the Quebec Street lands were sold to Wyndham, the result would be a frustration of the comprehensive redevelopment plan decided upon, with the approval of the Minister, in the public interest. Wyndham has submitted that this result should not be of concern because the City could then expropriate the Wyndham parcel to return it into the redevelopment fold. I do not think that the possibility of “coopering up” by this purely incidental and cumbersome process, which would take place after s. 315 had had its effect, would reasonably enable one to conclude that the intent of s. 22(8)(b) had not been frustrated.
 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs including the costs of the motion before Borins J.A. I would fix the costs of the motion at $4,000 and those of the appeal at $10,500, both inclusive of disbursements and GST.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Note 1: This judgment was granted on December 12, 2001 on the application by the City under rule 14.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. On the same date, Caswell J. made an order in an action commenced against the City by Wyndham that stated that, in view of the judgment in the application, it was “neither necessary nor appropriate to deal with” a motion by Wyndham for leave to register a certificate of pending litigation against the lands in question in both proceedings. Wyndham also appealed from this order to this court and this appeal was formally before us on the hearing of the appeal from the judgment made on the application. The order is clearly interlocutory and not appealable to this court (Albert v. Spiegel (1993), 17 C.P.C. (3d) 90 (C.A.)) and the parties consented to an order quashing it, without costs.
Note 2: Caswell J’s reasons refer to the relevant provisions in the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379 and not to their counterparts in the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13 reads, in part:
74(1) In this section, “former Act” means the Planning Act, being chapter 379 of the Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1980.
(2) Despite the repeal of the former Act by section 73 of the Planning Act, 1983, being chapter 1, any matter or proceeding mentioned in subsection (3) that was commenced under the former Act before the 1st day of August, 1983, shall be continued and finally disposed of under the former Act.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a matter or proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced, in the case of,
* * * * *
(b) redevelopment under section 22 of the former Act, on the day the by-law designating the redevelopment area is passed;
There is no significant difference between the corresponding provisions in R.S.O. 1980 and R.S.O. 1990 and, as did Caswell J., I shall, in the main, refer to the R.S.O. 1980 provisions. In the R.S.O. 1990 version, which originated
in S.O. 1983, c. 1, the term “community improvement” replaces “redevelopment”.